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Abstract
In a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework, with sticky
prices, the cross sectional distribution of output and ination across a population
of rms is studied. The only form of heterogeneity is conned to the probability
that the ith rm changes its prices in response to a shock. In this Calvo setup the
moments of the cross sectional distribution of output and ination depend crucially
on the proportion of rms that are allowed to change their prices. We test this
model empirically using German balance sheet data on a very large population
of rms. We nd a signicant counter-cyclical correlation between the skewness
of output responses and the aggregate economy. Further analysis of sectoral data
for the US suggests that there is a positive relationship between the skewness of
ination and aggregates, but the relation with output skewness is less sure. Our
results can be interpreted as indirect evidence of the importance of price stickiness
in macroeconomic adjustment.
JEL: D12, E52, E43.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of, amongst others, Mankiw (1985), Akerlof and Yellen (1985)
and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) who (re-)stressed the importance of frictions for at
least the short term performance of the economy, the interest in models now termed
New-Keynesian or New Neo-classical Synthesis (NNS) has increased dramatically. The
workhorse of modern macroeconomics is some form of a DSGE-model incorporating fric-
tions of various kinds, and in particular sticky prices. Those models are used to address a
wide variety of macroeconomic questions arising from discussion of monetary policy (e.g.
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Clarida, Galí and Gertler 1999), scal policy (e.g. Woodford, 1997) or open economy
issues (e.g. Bowman and Doyle 2003).
The models are usually tested empirically by comparing the theoretical impulse re-
sponse functions with empirical impulse response functions obtained from a VAR-analysis
(e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford 1998). These empirical checks all utilize aggregate data
for the output gap or the ination rate. Both are readily available from the simulation
of the model and the empirical time series are easy to obtain.
In two recent papers (Higson et al. 2002 and Higson et al. 2004) the emphasis has
been to use cross-sectional data to establish some stylised facts of the business cycle
at the micro-level. Using large data sets on US and UK rms, the distribution of the
growth rate of rmsreal sales was examined. The most striking nding was a signicant
counter-cyclical correlation between the cross sectional skewness of the distribution and
the aggregate economy. These stylised facts need some theoretical explanation1. In
this paper we seek an explanation in a simple New Keynesian model with Calvo-type
sticky prices. Price decisions are time dependent but the times between price changes
are probabilistic. The probability is set exogenously2. The purpose of this paper is to
use the simplest form of the New Keynesian model with sticky prices to examine the
relationship between the cross sectional moments of output and the aggregate economy
and then to test the predictions on rm level data for Germany. It can also be thought
of as an indirect way of testing if the assumption of sticky prices3 is in line with the
empirical evidence4.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section a simplied version of
a New Keynesian model with sticky prices drawing on Woodford (1997) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (1998) is presented and simulated. The pattern of the higher moments of
the distribution of output growth and price changes is examined. The results are than
compared to empirical results obtained from conducting an analysis in the vein of Higson
et al. (2002 and 2004) using a German dataset. This dataset has the advantage of having
ten times as many rms per year as the datasets used by Higson et al. And while Higson
et al. only have quoted companies in their sample the German sample also includes non-
quoted companies. The di¢ culty with the German data set at the level of the rm is
that we do not have information on prices. So we turn to sectoral data for the US.
2 The model
The model presented in this section is a simplied version of Woodford (1997) and Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1998). Both articles present a general equilibrium model incorpo-
rating price stickiness in a Calvo (1983) form. The simplication made in this paper is to
neglect the government sector and money-in-utility function. Since we are interested in
1A alternative explanation that identies heterogeneity in the nancial state of the rm as important
is explored in Holly and Santoro (2008).
2Recently Sheedy (2007) has proposed the idea that the probability that a rm changes its price is
not set exogenously as in the Calvo model but depends on the time that has elapsed since the last price
change. The longer the duration, the higher the probability of a change in prices. The hazard function
describing price changes is upward sloping rather than at as in the Calvo model.
3The menu cost model of Ball and Mankiw (1994, 1995) also generates interesting interactions between
cross sectional moments and the aggregate economy. However, for a recent challenge to this model see
Demery and Duck (2008).
4Recently, Gabaix (2005) and Delli Gatti et al. (2007) have also suggested new approaches to mod-
elling aggregate uctuations based on micro-evidence.
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the intra cross sectional distribution of output and prices for the aggregate economy and
not in specic economic policy questions, those simplications should be straightforward.
The model consists of a continuum of identical, innitely living households. Each
household j 2 [0; 1] produces a single di¤erentiated good. Monopolistic competition,
which is assumed to prevail follows Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976) so sup-
pliers can set their prices. Each household maximises lifetime utility over all periods
t :
Et
( 1X
t=0
t

u
 
Cjt
  v (yt (j))) (1)
In equation (1), u is a concave and v a convex utility function with u,v>0.  is
a discount factor and yt(j) denotes the household-produced good of the jth household..
v (yt (j)) represents the disutility of producing the good. C
j
t is the consumption index of
the household j, which is given by:
Cjt 
Z 1
0
cjt (z)
 1
 dz
 
 1
(2)
In equation (2), cjt (z) denotes the consumption of good z by household j in period
t.  > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the individual goods. The price
index is dened as:
Pt 
Z 1
0
pt (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
(3)
where pt (z) denotes the price of good z in period t.
The minimization of expenditure
R 1
0
pt (z) c
j
t (z) dz for a given level of the consumption
index (2) leads to the Dixit-Stiglitz demand function for each good z :
cjt (z) = C
j
t

pt (z)
Pt
 
(4)
Equation (4) shows how a given consumption level Cjt is allocated among the di¤erent
goods cjt (z) in t. The optimal consumption basket C
j
t for each period t is determined
by maximizing the intertemporal utility function (1) subject to the intertemporal budget
constraint:
1X
t=0

1
1 + it
t
PtC
j
t  Bjt +
1X
t=0

1
1 + it
t
pt (j) yt (j) (5)
where it is the nominal interest rate and B
j
t is the wealth of the household at the start
of period t. The left hand is the present value of consumption expenditure while the right
hand is the present value of selling the householdsown product plus initial wealth.
Solving this gives to the standard Euler-equation (and pricing kernal):

u0
 
Cjt+1

u0
 
Cjt
 = 1
1 + it
Pt+1
Pt
(6)
Assuming a perfect capital market and identical utility functions for all households,
equation (6) holds for the whole economy. In a frictionless world identical households
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would choose identical values for all variables Cjt etc. Due to sticky price adjustment
households di¤er in income over time. Households can insure themselves against these
variations using capital markets, so even with rigidities the path of all variables is equal
for all households. Consequently the index j can be omitted from hereon.
Together with a policy rule for the central bank determining the interest rate it,
equations (4) to (6) represent the demand side of our economy. Turning to the supply
side, sticky price adjustment has to be taken into account. In each period a household is
able to change the price of its own product with probability 1   . After adjusting the
price at the beginning of period t, the price will prevail in t+1 with probability , in t+2
with probability 2 and so on. Each household j sets its price to maximise the present
value of future revenues minus the loss of utility stemming from the work necessary to
produce the good:
1X
k=0
k
(
tEt
"
1
1 + it
k
pt (j) yt+k (j)
#
  kEt [v (yt+k (j))]
)
(7)
t is households marginal utility for an additional unit of nominal income in period
t. Since the receipts for good j play only an innitesimal role in the budget constraint
(5) marginal utility is assumed to be constant and omitted form the subsequent analysis
(Woodford, 1997). The demand function for the good yt (j) is given by (4) and depends
on the price pt (j). The derivative with respect to pt (j) yields the rst-order condition
for the optimal price pt (j):
1X
k=0
kEt
(
1
1 + it
k
Ct+k

pt (j)
Pt+k
 
[pt (j)  St+k;t]
)
= 0 (8)
where   
 1 > 1 holds.  denotes a mark-up of prices over marginal costs, with
St+k;t.representing the degree of monopoly power. Marginal costs are the cost of producing
an additional good in t+ k, given that the price has been chosen in period t:
St+k;t =
v0

Ct

pt (j)
Pt+k
 
u0 (Ct+k)
Pt+k (9)
The optimal price to be set in period t depends only on expectations of future con-
sumption demand Ct+k and the future price level Pt+k. Since households are identical
they form the same expectations and choose the same optimal price if they are in a po-
sition to adjust. Thus the overall price index P t for all prices changed in t equals p

t (j).
From (3) it follows that the overall price index of the economy is a CES function given
by
Pt =

P 1 t 1 + (1  )P  1 t
 1
1  (10)
In other words, the current price level is a probability-weighted average of last periods
prices and the price index of the adjusted prices in t.
It is assumed that the utility function u (Ct) is an iso-elastic function:
u (Ct) =
C1 t
1   (11)
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with  > 0, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Since we assume
that the economy is closed without government and without private investment the only
component of aggregated demand is consumption (Rotemberg and Woodford 1998, p
14). Thus consumption may be replaced by total income, Y. Log-linearising (6) using
(11) around the steady state leads to:
Y^t = EtY^t+1   1

(it   Ett+1   r) (12)
with  denoting the ination rate, values denoted with a hat representing percentage
deviations from equilibrium and r is the equilibrium real interest rate.
Log-linarizing equations (9) to (11) yields:
^t = Et^t+1 + Y^t (13)
with
  (1  ) (1  )

:
! +  1
 1 (! + )
(14)
and !  v0(Y )
v00(Y )Y . This is the New-Keynesian Phillips curve: deviations of ination
from its equilibrium depend on the level of the output gap and expectations of future
ination.
Equation (13) can also be written as:
P^ t =

1  
1X
k=0
()k EtY^t+k +
1X
k=1
()k Et^t+k (15)
Equation (15) states that the deviation (P^ t ) of the optimal relative price of rm j,
pt (j) =Pt, from its equilibrium value depends on the probability weighted expectation
of future output gaps (Y^t+k) and the future deviation of ination from its equilibrium
(^t+k)5.
The last remaining building block of the model is the determination of the interest
rate. An interest rate rule can also be derived from a microfounded approach6 but since
the main focus of the paper is not central bank behaviour we take a rule that has empirical
support. In particular we assume a sort of a Taylor-rule with some degree of interest rate
smoothing (see eg Clarida, Galí, Gertler 2000):
it = (1  )

 + bY^ Y^t + b^^t

+  it 1 (16)
With the specication of an interest rate the model is closed. The model, the work-
horse of modern monetary analysis (McCallum 2001)7 can be summarised as:
EtY^t+1 +
1

Ett+1   1

it = Y^t   "t
5This equation will be important for calculating the behaviour of the single rm later on.
6See Corrado and Holly (2007).
7Of course there have been numerous extensions to the vanilla version of the NKM since the initial
e¤orts. However, for our purposes it is unnecessary to introduce further complications when our main
concern is to examine the cross sectional implications of heterogeneous price and output adjustment over
the business cycle.
5
Ett+1 = t   Y^t   t (17)
it = (1  )

bY^ Y^t + bt

+  it 1 + t
For the sake of simplicity, the equilibrium real interest rate is set to zero. If the target
ination rate is also set to zero, this implies an equilibrium nominal interest rate of zero.
"t, t and t are independently, normally distributed error terms with zero mean and
time-invariant variance. "t can be interpreted as a demand shock. t is the supply shock
and. t is a monetary shock.
3 Model Solution
The common approach in the literature is to use the symmetric equilibrium features of
the model to solve for deviations of the aggregate level of output and ination from a
steady state. However, we are also interested in the cross sectional distribution of price
and output adjustment. The problem then is how do we simulate a disaggregated version
of the NK model? One way would be to iterate over the population of m rms, aggregate
using equations (4) and (10) and determine the expected aggregate price and output and
re-iterate8. An alternative procedure is to take advantage of the fact the Dixit-Stiglitz
expression can be thought of as an exact or perfect aggregator9. It follows that if we know
the aggregates, the Dixit-Stiglitz expression is also the perfect disaggregator (Grossman
and Stiglitz, 1976).
We can write the companion form of the aggregate model as:
A0zt = A1zt 1 + A2Etzt+1 + t (18)
where zt = (Y^t; ^t; it)0, t = ("t; t; t)
0; and:
A0 =
24 1 0 1  1 0
  (1  ) bY^  b 1
35 ; A1 =
241 0 00 1 0
0 0 
35 ; A2 =
241 1 00  0
0 0 0
35 :
We then use the algorithm from Stock and Watson (2002) which generalises Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980) to derive the reduced form as a vector autoregression from which
standard impulse functions can be obtained. This makes it possible to simulate the model
for n periods resulting in aggregate paths for Y^t,^t and it.
In order to derive the price and the output response for each household/rm j in t,
yt (j), we have to disaggregate the aggregate response using equation (15) in which the
optimal relative price of the rm j is calculated as a deviation from the optimal relative
price. The latter is normalised to 1. To do this the expected future values for Y^t and ^t
have to be calculated. Assuming that individuals are rational and shocks have an expected
value of zero these values are obtained from the impulse response functions. To take the
present state of the economy into account the impulse responses have to be calculated
with the period t value of the state variable it. After calculating the optimal price in t, we
8See also den Haan (1997).
9This follows from it being homogeneous of degree one. In the econometrics literature a perfect
aggregator denotes a situation in which the average of parameters at the micro level is the same as the
parameters estimated at the aggregate level. See Pesaran et al (1989) and references therein.
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have to determine if a certain rm changes its price in this period. Therefore for each rm
a sequence of length n of realisations qt from a random variable with uniform distribution
Qt  U (0; 1) is calculated. For each period t the following expression applies:10
pt (j)
Pt
=
(
P^ t + 1 for qt  1  
pt 1(j)
Pt
for qt > 1   (19)
After determining the relative price for each rm j, the demand function (5) can be
used to calculate output yt (j). By simulating (17) one obtains the output gap. After
normalising the equilibrium output gap to 1 it is possible to calculate real output for each
rm11.
3.1 Calibration
To solve the model parameters have to be calibrated. A rst crucial assumption is the
value of the parameter  which represents the probability of a rm not changing its
price in period t. If  = 0 all prices are perfectly exible and each rm can respond
immediately to changes in the aggregate environment. Since all rms are by assumption
equal they will choose the same price and will end up with the same output level. The
result would be perfect homogeneity. A similar argument can be made for the case
 = 1. Here all rms cannot change their price. If the parameter lies between the two
extremes and, for example a negative shock hits the economy, the demand for all goods
decreases. Individual rms will be a¤ected by the shock in di¤erent ways according to
their ability to change prices. Firms that can change their prices will lower them, leading
to a smaller reduction in output compared with rms that have to stick to their initial
prices. If a large fraction of rms cannot change its prices (i.e. if  is large) a large
fraction of the distribution of rms will end up with relatively lower output while only a
small fraction will be able to increase their output relative to other rms. The skewness
of the distribution would become positive and therefore counter-cyclical. By contrast if
many rms are allowed to change prices the mass of the distribution will have relatively
small falls in output while a small fraction of rms who are not able to change prices will
su¤er heavier output falls. The skewness in this case would be negative and pro-cyclical.
The behaviour of prices will provide a mirror image to the response of output. Hence,
the value of parameter  is crucial for the predictions of the model concerning the skew-
ness of the cross-section distribution. In the simulations the sensitivity of the results to
di¤erent values of  and therefore the degree of price stickiness will be examined.
Plausible settings for  may be derived from studies of the average time period be-
tween two price changes, which is given by 1
1  (Rotemberg and Woodford 1998: 22).
Unfortunately, several studies came up with quite di¤erent results12 ranging from 4 to
30 months implying values for  ranging from 0.03 to 0.67 on an annual base and values
between 0.125 and 0.9 on a quarterly basis.
For the other parameters in the model, the literature also uses values within a certain
range. To make our results robust we therefore consider three scenarios: one is a baseline
10Note that the addition of 1 in the upper part of the expression stems from the normalisation of the
equilibrium relative price to 1.
11Given that we are using a linearisation of the model it is the case that the sum of each rms price
and output response is not quite equal to the aggregate response calculated from equation (15). However,
the di¤erence is very small.
12See, e.g., Cecchetti (1986), Carlton (1986), Blinder (1994) and Kashyap (1995).
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scenario with parameters taken from Woodford (1997), a second follows Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998) and a third uses the settings of McCallum (2001). An overview is given
in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter Values used in Calibration.
Parameter Baseline-
scenario
Rotemberg
andWoodford
McCallum
 0.95 0.99 0.99
 19.97 7.88 9.03
 1 6.25 2.5
! 1.66 0.47 0.23
The base-line scenario has the advantage of using parameters for annual data which
will be used in the empirical analysis in the next section. Unfortunately the values for
 and ! are not given in Woodford (1997) and have to be inferred by methods used in
Rotemberg andWoodford (1998) in the case of  or plausible values have to be assumed as
it is the case for !. The values for the Rotemberg andWoodford scenario are all estimated
but only for quarterly data. They admit that the value for is too high to be plausible.
We therefore simulate the results with a more plausible value given by McCallum(2001).
Here again the values for  and ! are not given and have to be inferred. Since none of
the parameter settings is entirely satisfactory we use all three to check for the robustness
of the results.
Finally the parameters of the interest rate rule have to be specied. Parameters
provided by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) are used13.The parameters of the interest
rate rule are set to bY^ = 0.25, b =1.3 and  = 0.9.
4 Simulation results
With the calibrated parameters at hand, we simulate the model for 1000 rms and 1000
periods. We then report results based only on the middle 800 periods of the simulation to
make sure that the results are independent of the starting values. Table 2 summarises the
standard deviation and the coe¢ cient for the rst order autocorrelation for the output
gap in all three scenarios and the output gap for annual German GDP14. The time series
for GDP starts in 1971 and ends in 2004. The output gap was obtained using a Hodrick-
Prescott-Filter with lambda set to 6.25 (Ravn and Uhlig 2002).
The theoretical autocorrelation is higher in the baseline and McCallum scenarios
than the actual autocorrelation. The standard deviation for the McCallum, as well as
our baseline scenario, is also too high. The Rotemberg and Woodford parameterisation
leads to the best t with the actual results. Given the simple structure of the model the
weak t for two of the scenarios should not be treated too seriously.
13Note, however, that these settings are broadly in line with the empirical results of Gerberding, Seitz
and Worms (2007).The authors show, that Bundesbank policy can best be described in terms of a money
supply rule, but that this rule may be transformed into a interest rate rule with some degree of interest
rate smoothing.
14GDP is annual real GDP for Germany adjusted for the reunication by calculating backward GDP
for the unied Germany in 1991 with West-German growth rates (Sachverständigenrat 2001, p 252).
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Figure 1: Correlation of simulated aggregate output growth with the cross
section moments for di¤erent values of .
Table 2: Empirical and theoretical standard deviations and autocorrelation.
output
gap
Baseline Rotemberg
and Wood-
ford
McCallum
 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.8
SD 1.1 4.22 6.21 7.74 1.16 1.86 2.6 2.65 4.78 4.11
AC 0.34 0.53 0.67 0.86 0.33 0.43 0.85 0.54 0.8 0.72
In Figure 1 the results for all three scenarios are summarised. The left column of
graphs shows the results for the baseline scenario, the middle column is for the Rotem-
berg/Woodford values and the right column includes the results for the McCallum sce-
nario. The rst graph in each column shows the correlation coe¢ cient (y-axis) of the
variance with the growth rate of output for di¤erent values of  (x-axis). The second
graph shows the correlation coe¢ cient for skewness and the last one for kurtosis. The dot-
ted lines are a condence band according to the rule-of-thumb for a correlation coe¢ cient
signicantly di¤erent from zero (2=
p
T ).
It becomes apparent that for low values of  the moments are markedly pro-cyclical.
For higher values of   about 0.6 or higher  skewness becomes markedly counter-
cyclical. For  values of 0.7 or higher the skewness is counter-cyclical while the correlation
with variance is negative but not signicant. The same holds for kurtosis. When the
proportion of rms that can change their prices is similar to to those who cannot (around
 = 0:5) there is an insignicant correlation between skewness and aggregate growth.
The relationship between skewness in the cross section and the aggregate economy may
be able, indirectly, to tell us something about the extent of price stickiness at the level
of the rm.
As a rst robustness check the results are reproduced based on the parameter values
from Rotemberg and Woodford (1998). Again, for low values of  the results indicate
a non-cyclical or a weak pro-cyclical behaviour of the cross-section moments. With in-
creasing -values in particular the correlation coe¢ cient for skewness becomes more and
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more counter-cyclical as can be seen in the middle column of gure 1. This result is
based on parameters obtained from quarterly data therefore the -values necessary for a
counter-cyclical skewness are much more likely.
As a second robustness check the parameter values according to McCallum are applied.
Again for parameter values for  of 0.7 or higher skewness becomes pronounced counter-
cyclical. The results for variance however are di¤erent to the other two scenarios: here the
correlation is positive and for  > 0.6 even signicantly positive. Since these results are
for quarterly parameters the counter-cyclical skewness is obtained for plausible -values.
Price stickiness in the model arises from both the Calvo pricing rule and from the
presence of imperfectly competitive rms. Figure 2 shows how the correlation between
the aggregate economy and skewness varies (for  xed at 0.7) with the degree of imper-
fect competition (captured by ). As  rises and competition increases the relationship
between skewness and the aggregate economy, as expected, disappears.
The counterpart to the output decision is also the pricing decision. Figure 3 shows the
correlation between the aggregate economy and skewness for di¤erent values of . For
values of  greater than 0.2 there is a signicant positive relationship between skewness
and the aggregate economy15.
An otherwise standard New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing, where the only
form of heterogeneity lies in whether or not a rm changes its prices, has the interesting
property that there will be a relationship between the cross sectional moments of ination
and output and the aggregate economy and this relationship varies with the degree of
price stickiness in a Calvo economy. This suggests that an indirect test of the degree
of price stickiness can be derived from an analysis of the cross section of rms and the
aggregate economy. To this we turn in the next section.
15Although we do not report the results there is also a signicant relationship between ination skew-
ness and aggregate ination. Ball and Mankiw (1995) nd a similar positive relationship using a menu
cost model.
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Figure 2: Correlation between Aggregate growth and skewness for di¤erent
values of .
5 The cross-sectional dynamics of the German busi-
ness cycle: some empirical evidence
In this section we turn to an empirical examination using data for German companies16.
We use the Bundesbanks unbalanced corporate balance sheets statistics database (Un-
ternehmesbilanzstatistik, UBS for short). This is the largest database of non-nancial
rms in Germany. The Bundesbank has collected the data when o¤ering rediscounting
and lending operations on a strictly condential basis. To enable the Bundesbank to
carry out an extensive evaluation of their creditworthiness, the enterprises submitted
their annual accounts to the branch o¢ ces of the German State Central Banks (Lan-
deszentralbanken). They were then recorded electronically, audited, and evaluated for
purposes of trade bill transactions. The Bundesbank received around 60,000 annual ac-
counts per annum. In addition, the Bundesbank performed checks for logical errors and
missing data in the database as well as consistency checks and error corrections. Accord-
ing to Stoess (2001), the unbalanced panel dataset comprises only about 4% of the total
number of enterprises in Germany but about 60% of the total turnover of the corporate
sector. Another key advantage of the database is that it comprises both incorporated and
unincorporated rms. This has some appeal since the small and medium-sized rms in
Germany (Mittelständische Wirtschaft) show up in our sample17. Our micro database
therefore gives a faithful representation of the German economy. In contrast to previous
16Bryan and Cecchetti (1999) have drawn attention to a potentially serious problem associated with
trying to establish a possible relationship between the mean and the skewness of a sampling distribution
using panel data. However, given the size of the dataset this bias is unlikely to be signicant. For an
approach that uses a random cross section sample split see Gerlach and Kuglar (2007).
17More than 80% of the included enterprises are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with an
annual turnover less than 100 million DM, and more than half of the dataset consists of unincorporated
rms.
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studies, we were able to use data from 1971 to 1998 for most of the analysis18. Even
though the number of rediscount lending operations dropped sharply with the start of
European Monetary Union at the beginning of 1999, the Bundesbank tries to continue
its comprehensive review of the credit standing of German enterprises involved in redis-
count transactions. However, eligible enterprises now submit their balance sheets to the
European Central Bank. This change of competence is the reason why 1998 is the last
year of the period covered.
Although the theoretical and simulation part of the paper was concerned with both
output and ination, data on the price setting of individual rms is not available. Since we
are mainly interested in the development of real sales19 we have relatively few data losses
owing to incomplete and inconsistent reporting. Real sales growth is calculated for each
rm by deating the rmssales with the deator of real GDP and afterwards taking the
di¤erence of the logarithm of real sales.20 Following Higson et al. (2002, 2004), we take
into account outliers by winsorizing the data, that is, by employing several cut-o¤ rates,
ie a fraction of, say a 50% growth rate, is truncated from the data. Some kind of cut-o¤
seems to be necessary as some changes in real sales might be inuenced, for example,
by mergers. It is clear that a cut-o¤ is a rather crude method to get rid of outliers and
mergers. Unfortunately, no variable was included in the dataset to indicate whether a
merger had occurred or not21. This has the advantage of not being too restrictive while
getting rid of most of the outliers and a lot of the mergers.22 In Table 3 some summary
statistics for the dataset using a +/- 50% cut-o¤ are presented.
In Figure 3 the moments of the annual growth rate of real sales (line) are shown to-
gether with the growth rate of real GDP (bar) as a measure for business cycle conditions
resembling Figure 2.
18We thank the Statistics Department of the Deutsche Bundesbank, in particular Tim Körting, for
excellent research assistance.
19The analysis is in terms of output rather than sales. Gabaix (2005) using the results of Hulten (1978)
establishes an equivalance between (value added) output and rm sales.
20One might argue that each sector should be deated with its respective deator. With only a few
exceptions, e.g. computer manufacturing, the sectoral deators all move closely together so that the
GDP-deator appears to be a good approximation.
21The cut-o¤ may also eliminate some newly formed rms as well as rms going bankrupt. Note that
numerous other studies su¤er from similar problems.
22We also did several robustness checks using di¤erent cut-o¤s and checked the dropped observations
for some form of regularity which was not the case. For a more thorough discussion see the working
paper version of this paper Doepke et al. (2005).
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Figure 3: Moments of truncated (fty percent) growth cross-section distribu-
tion against GDP growth, 1973-1998.
Table 4 provides regressions of the empirical moments (m) on up to 2 lags of the
moments, and current and lagged aggregate output growth. The central moments are
very strongly correlated with the aggregate economy. However, the variance is only
weakly correlated with lagged output growth. By contrast, and in accordance with the
predictions of the model of this paper, skewness is strongly counter-cyclical, suggesting
considerable price stickiness at the micro level. Again, consistent with the model, kurtosis
is independent of the aggregate business cycle23.
5.1 Evidence from US Sectoral Data
Although we nd a very signicant relationship between the skewness of output and the
aggregate economy with rm-level data we do not have price data for rms. In this
section we use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database24. The database covers
all 4-digit manufacturing industries from 1958 to 1996 ordered by 1987 SIC codes, with
a total of 459 industries25. We take value-added and deate by the price deator for
shipments. We then compute skewness in each year for the change in real value-added
and the change in prices. The results are shown in Table 5. We use two measures of
the aggregate economy. We take the median growth rate of the 459 industries in each
year. We also use the rate of growth of GDP26. The second and third columns report
regressions of the skewness of ination and output against current and lagged values of
the median growth rate. The fourth and fth columns report the same regressions but
using GDP. For the median growth rate we nd a signicant positive e¤ect of (lagged)
growth on the skewness of ination, as suggested by the earlier model. We also nd a
positive e¤ect when we use GDP but it is now only signicant at the 10 per cent level.
For the skewness of output the results are much less supportive and appear to contradict
23By contrast in the menu costs model of Ball and Mankiw (1994) both varance and skewness should
be signicant.
24For a description of the data see Bartelsman, Becker, and Gray (1996). "NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database". Available at http://www.nber.org/nberces/nbprod96.htm.
25As in other studies we exclude the "Asbestos Product" industry (SIC 3292) because the time series
ends in 1993.
26This is taken from the St Louis database. Series GDPCA from the U.S. Department of Commerce:
Bureau of Economic Analysis, in Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars
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the ndings for Germany (and also for rm-level data for the US, the UK and Italy. See
Holly and Santoro (2008) for a summary of this empirical evidence).
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a simplied version of Woodford (1997) and Rotemberg
and Woodford (1998) using the DSGE framework to simulate the implications for the
cross sectional distribution of rms implicitly embedded in the model because of the
heterogeneity that arises from Calvo pricing. In each period not all rms are able to
change their prices. This property generates a correlation between the skewness of the
cross section of price changes and aggregate ination, and a correlation between the
skewness of output changes and the aggregate growth of the economy. The sign of these
correlations depends on the proportion of rms that are able to alter prices. For large
values of , where 1  of rms change prices in any period, the correlation with skewness
is positive for price changes and negative for output. Moreover, there is no correlation
with the variance or the kurtosis of the cross section distribution. These theoretical
results go some way to explaining the stylised factsthat have been previously identied
by Higson et al (2002, 2004) for the US and the UK.
Using a considerably larger dataset for Germany, comprising an average of almost
54,000 rms in each of 27 years, we are able to largely conrm the predictions of the
Calvo model (at least for output changes). There is a signicant relationship between
the skewness of output changes and the aggregate economy. Turning to US sectoral data
for 39 years, our results are more mixed. We nd - as predicted - a signicant positive
relationship between the skewness of ination and output. However, in contrast to the
rm level data we are not able to detect a signicant negative relationship between the
skewness of output and the aggregate economy. Our paper, in essence, o¤ers an indirect
way of testing for the causes of frictions that generate price stickiness.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for growth rates of real sales: fty percent
cut-of f
Year Mean Median Standard
devia-
tion
Skewness Kurtosis Obs.
1972 0.026 0.023 0.16 -0.01 3.59 29,319
1973 0.030 0.029 0.17 -0.02 3.42 30,965
1974 -0.005 -0.006 0.18 0.03 3.14 32,987
1975 -0.018 -0.018 0.18 0.06 3.10 37,561
1976 0.065 0.065 0.17 -0.19 3.43 46,596
1977 0.046 0.042 0.16 -0.06 3.67 54,902
1978 0.002 0.002 0.16 -0.05 3.82 61,136
1979 0.058 0.052 0.16 -0.05 3.70 65,630
1980 0.030 0.028 0.16 -0.01 3.69 65,006
1981 -0.020 -0.022 0.16 0.14 3.70 59,974
1982 -0.030 -0.034 0.16 0.20 3.78 60,368
1983 0.015 0.012 0.16 -0.02 3.74 61,871
1984 0.030 0.023 0.16 0.02 3.68 63,408
1985 0.019 0.017 0.17 -0.04 3.62 63,322
1986 0.016 0.014 0.16 -0.08 3.73 63,263
1987 0.010 0.008 0.16 -0.01 3.85 62,059
1988 0.044 0.040 0.16 -0.07 3.94 61,243
1989 0.055 0.051 0.15 -0.12 4.05 59,427
1990 0.064 0.058 0.16 -0.11 3.77 56,991
1991 0.064 0.063 0.17 -0.19 3.50 55,415
1992 -0.011 -0.018 0.17 0.19 3.55 55,218
1993 -0.063 -0.064 0.17 0.29 3.50 55,334
1994 0.016 0.009 0.17 0.06 3.58 55,570
1995 0.017 0.011 0.16 0.04 3.67 55,804
1996 -0.006 -0.009 0.16 0.07 3.83 53,299
1997 0.023 0.018 0.15 -0.04 4.04 49,620
1998 0.017 0.013 0.15 -0.01 4.07 38,796
All 0.019 0.016 0.17 -0.01 3.57 1,455,084
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Table 4: Regression of cross section moments on aggregate growth
Notes: For all tests p-values are reported. The p-values for the t-tests (in brackets) are based on
a robust covariance matrix calculated using the Newey and West method. The test for autocorrelation
is a Breusch/Godfrey test, the test for heteroskedasticity is a White test, the RESET test is a Ramsey
test for functional form. The test for normality is the Jarque/Bera test.
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Table 5: Regression of Skewness in output and prices on aggregate economy.
Notes: see Table 4.
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